Kenneth Roy The Expert View is Wrong

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Kenneth Roy

The expert view is wrong.
These deaths could
have been prevented

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Bob Cant

What does
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John Cameron

The great ‘Chariots
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everything: the new

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Islay McLeod

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Saltire09.05.12
No. 547

essayoftheweekDamnably difficult questions about modern art

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Douglas Hall, first keeper of the Scottish National Gallery of Modern Art, replies to criticism of his custodianship

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6


World

Seal Team 6 gives

the world a glimpse

into Bin Laden’s mind

 

Alan Fisher

 

When US special forces were sent into a compound in Abbottabad a year ago, their mission wasn’t just to kill or capture Osama Bin Laden. They were told to gather as much intelligence as they could.

     It’s thought that Seal Team 6 recovered thousands of documents stored on computers, external hard drives and data-sticks. After an in-depth analysis, some have been disregarded as useless irrelevant trivia, while others provided high-quality intelligence. Of all the documents recovered, just 17 have been de-classified.    
     Covering a five-year period – from 2006 until just before his death in 2011 – this highly selective release provides a small insight into the workings of Al Qaeda, groups that claim links to it and Bin Laden himself.
     Stephen Tankel of American University told me: ‘Bin Laden did not die a happy man in terms of how he saw the direction of Al Qaeda going. One of the things that comes through very clearly from the documents is his concern for the state of the affiliates, the lack of control he had over them, and the damage they were doing to the group’s name and reputation’.
     Certainly what emerges is a frustrated Bin Laden. Through a series of envoys and go-betweens, he is in contact with many who claim to share his views and aspirations around the world, but he can’t make them do what he wants. One of the biggest sources of concern is that the affiliates kill many more Muslims than Americans, losing them support among the local population. He has seen the problem develop through the links he established in Iraq with Abu Musaib al-Zarqawi, and he writes to several groups trying to convince them not to make the same mistakes. He sees his grand strategy being undermined at what he clearly feels is the political ineptitude and perhaps even stupidity of his own supporters.

 

One of Bin Laden’s last letters was dated just a week before his death. He suggested that the Arab Spring, which he described as a formidable event, presented an opportunity for him and his group.

     In fact, attacks on mosques and innocents almost brought Bin Laden into direct confrontation with the Taliban in Pakistan. It’s been widely thought that Tehrik-e-Taliban acted as a proxy for Al Qaeda but the documents reveal deep divisions. Two senior figures close to Bin Laden sent a strongly-worded letter to TTP leader, Hakimullah Mahsud, to express displeasure with the group’s ‘ideology, methods and behaviour’, and there was a threat that there would be real and public consequences ‘unless we see from you serious and immediate practical and clear steps towards reforming (your ways)’.
     Interestingly, there is nothing in this selective release to suggest there was any explicit support from the Pakistani authorities for Bin Laden and Al Qaeda. Immediately after the Abbottabad raid, many suggested that senior figures in the Pakistani military if not the government were helping to shield Bin Laden.
     Another myth dented by the release of the papers is the relationship between Iran and Al Qaeda. As with the allegations linking Saddam Hussein to the organisation as a central pretext for the war in Iraq, it’s been suggested that Iran and Bin Laden were closely aligned. What emerges is that the two had a fairly hostile relationship. For example, to get family members out of Iran, Bin Laden ordered the kidnap of an Iranian diplomat who was then traded. The Iranians released some of his relatives but then refused to free one of Bin Laden’s daughters, Fatima. This was seen as a double-cross and betrayal.
     One of Bin Laden’s last letters was dated just a week before his death. He suggested that the Arab Spring, which he described as a formidable event, presented an opportunity for him and his group. He wanted to encourage those who had not yet revolted in the hope that they would create a series of Islamic states. 
     Until the end Bin Laden was convinced that Al Qaeda’s focus should be targeting America and Americans. He wanted another spectacular to mirror the events on 9/11. He talked about an operation to bring down Air Force One, the presidential plane carrying Barack Obama, believing that this would throw US foreign policy into disarray as the ‘utterly unprepared’ vice-president Joe Biden would automatically assume the presidency.
     Few though they are, the documents act as a reminder that while the death of Osama Bin Laden was a significant moment for the US, his organisation is still very much alive.

 

Alan Fisher

Alan Fisher is an Al Jazeera correspondent