Joanne McNally
The concocted case

We gained another insight into Tony Blair's mindset through his six hours of evidence to the Chilcot inquiry. What began as quite a robust questioning panel during the morning session had, by the afternoon, morphed almost into a propaganda platform at times for Blair to promote himself and his 'causes' (the next war in Iran, for instance, and his current role in the Middle East). He was able, and allowed to use the inquiry, to suit his own agenda, which was to keep highlighting the imminent threat from Iran, and the 'tyranny of terrorism' which is a 'constant problem for Israel'.
     There was little spark of humanity in his testimony; there was no sense that he cared about the suffering of the Iraqis since the invasion; and there was no sense that he cared about the soldiers who had lost their lives fighting for 'his cause' and no thought for the grieving families who were seated behind him. If 'his cause' was such a success and his decision was so right (which he kept saying it was), then why did it not even cross his mind to mention the families, or indeed thank them on behalf of their kin who made the ultimate sacrifice? But why should he? His mind is already very clearly set on the next war or wars as he made abundantly clear in his testimony. When he was given one last chance by Sir John Chilcot to make a final comment, he had nothing to say. That in itself speaks volumes.
     One cannot help now wondering whether this whole show was about preparing the country – and taxpayers – for the next war. I was struck by how often he was able to mention the growing threat from Iran, and seemingly without any reservations from the inquiry committee. Indeed, at the end, Sir John Chilcot's only concluding comment was that 'there are limits to what we can cover in one day' (yet surely Tony Blair can be asked to give further evidence, if necessary, and particularly after they have spoken to all their witnesses), succeeded by 'We shall want to pursue the issues he’s mentioned about Iran'.
     Another thing that struck me in relation to his mindset was just how often he 'was worried' in his years as Prime Minister. Yet it was his perception that was worrying him, not the hard facts about perceived threats, as they were very patchy. (He was also worried about the fact that the oil price per barrel had risen from $20 to $100 in 2002). It became clear that he has a mind that is unable to cope with uncertainty, or to include peoples of a different faith to his own. In fact, he even stated that his perception after 9/11 in relation to 'religious fanaticism' was 'they were going to kill very large numbers of us if they could'. He did not need facts, he had his conviction and his perception which justified, in his mind, pre-emptive action and the removal of Saddam. He admitted to having thought that as early as 1997-1998, and, in spite of his aversion to 'binary distinction' when it suits him (he stated at one point that 'Iraq was a separate issue' just after stating that the problems in the Middle East were 'not divisible problems' but rather 'one problem with multi-facets').
     Yet Iraq was never the dangerous threat to the UK. Blair confessed at one stage 'binary distinction between regime change and WMD always troubles me'. That's because one is legal and one is not. That is why he kept insisting on 'co-joined things' since 1998, on 'dual argument', on 'twin threats' such as WMD and terrorism. It was his mind making the links, because it wanted to do. It wanted the 'exemplary effect' (Sir Roderic Lynn's words). There were no links, as the Butler inquiry established.
     But Mr Blair could have been pressed more on the facts, or lack of them which influenced his perception and mindset (he did admit to the fact that he did not possess aspects of intelligence which could not be revealed in public). For instance, on the matter of Blair's desire to remove Saddam (that's to say 'regime change') certainly after 9/11, Sir Roderic Lynn stated that the facts about Iraq and WMD had not changed after 9/11, to which Tony Blair responded that the assessment of risk was based on perception, and that even before 11 September he had no faith in Saddam, and his perception changed dramatically after 9/11.
     He also stated that the meeting at Crawford in April 2002 was 'about regime change in part with WMD'. And here's the crux of the matter, or rather the 'lack of binary distinction' as Blair kept calling it: he was hedging his bets and arguing simultaneously on two fronts, one of which was legal and the other of which was illegal. Yet, in reality, WMD was always only used as a front, as his self-confessed real desire was to see Saddam removed. WMD was the legal cover he required for such an action, which is why the 'dodgy dossier(s)' is so pivotal, and why he wanted it to be 'toughened up'.
     His perception, his conviction about Saddam and WMD (he 'decided this intelligence justified' his desired action), and the production of a Downing Street-led dossier (the second dossier in existence after 9 September 2002), intended to convince the international community, parliament and the public at large that Iraq was a growing proliferation threat. In effect, he put the cart before the horse. Mr Blair stated at the Inquiry that 'virtually nobody doubted WMD’ and at the UN meeting of November 2002 ‘nobody disputed Saddam having WMD'. Quite. That was the whole point and effect of producing the second 'Downing Street-led dossier' (of at least two dossiers that were being worked on between 3 September and 24 September 2002) for publication. His intent was to strengthen the case for the removal of Saddam; to take clear and definitive action; to go all the way (as he had encouraged Bill Clinton to do in Kosovo in 1998).
     Mr Blair's logic and decision-making approach is worryingly distorted ('all about risks' and 'his perception') and self-deluded in style. 'Law and politics follow each other quite closely', he stated. But which follows which is the crucial matter, and the real one on trial. Ultimately, he had to make the decision and the judgment, he proclaimed. That is what we expect of both our judges and our political leaders. But we expect them to follow due process, legislature and international law; we expect such decisions and judgments to be based on careful consideration of all the facts and evidence, including the quality of the evidence before them; we expect them to engage properly in democratic processes, and not to discount, distort or discredit unwelcome arguments and statements.

Joanne McNally is writer and independent scholar and a campaigner and researcher in matters of truth and justice. Hear her read some poems at
www.lyrikline.org recorded as part of European Voices Festival, November 2008