The Chilcot inquiry II
Joanne McNally
The double act
Now we have heard evidence from the Prime Minister for the first time about the war on Iraq. He had not been called to speak at any previous inquiries. And we did indeed hear a leader speak. At least, we had the impression of a leader. And some of the time I was genuinely impressed by his responses. At other times, I was dismayed at what was being revealed, and how he responded to some questions (I shall come to that later).
And yet, on reflection, I have come to the conclusion that his performance was in fact a double act. Tony Blair was his foil. He was still ever present. Tony Blair is his stooge. Blair framed his evidence on perception (on mindsets); Brown focused on divisions and instability in the post Cold War. This simplistic view of the (new) world order was equally chilling. This was a dual defence and dual preparation for future (perhaps imminent) new wars. Blair and Brown were still as one on this. And in spite of all the misery and astronomical costs of previous wars under their regime, and which are still rising.
What dismayed me most was the sudden unity between Brown and Blair after all those years of notorious feuding and division. This sudden unity in relation to a 'new world order' in order to justify the military action against Iraq disturbed me. This is terminology used by Bush and co. This is the terminology of raw capitalism and imperialism; of Bush's 'New American Century' and with Britain (cloaked by a 'stronger Europe') once again the poodle.
For me, the alarm bells kept ringing when Brown continued to mouth like a puppet his vision of this new post-Cold War and the (non-defined) forces of instability which threaten it. Was it really necessary to commit these billions of pounds and thousands of lives for a 'test case' to see whether 'the international community were willing to use aggression in an unstable post Cold War'? What do the Iraqi civilians think of such a notion? What do the British forces feel? What would we as Iraqis feel on the receiving end of such a comment? I know what the armaments industry will think. And their share prices will have increased.
And then, even before the first coffee break, the true agenda emerged. In Brown's (and perhaps Obama's?) view 'the international institutions for global actions (yes, 'global actions', that's to say, global wars, or rather world wars) are not yet strong enough. We need an international system of governance'. He kept stressing that we were not there yet and a 'new world' was in process. At one point he even stated, rather overeagerly, that he was not sure that international consensus had to be there for reconstruction planning as the international institutions came into assist in May 2003, although they had declined to be involved prior to this. He also ended his testimony by stating that we 'must be more determined to shape [yes, shape] international institutions to get them to do what we want them to do…'
Brown spoke repeatedly of doing the right thing and for the right reasons in relation to Iraq, but is this just empty rhetoric? Downright stubbornness? I was horrified at the costs of the war(s) when the figures were revealed in their full detail and extensiveness. And can one honestly say that seven years later, we now have a 'just peace' in the area? And at what real cost?
Significantly, Brown repeatedly did 'not recall' at crucial moments in the questioning: he did not recall being shown the Cabinet 'options paper' of March 2002 which raised the issue of containment or regime change; he did not recall Robin Cook raising his concerns and queries in relation to the intelligence.
These are crucial matters with regard to the legitimacy of the war and the misleading of the public. They are crucial matters with respect to potential future wars.
The inquiry may not have the benefit of a barrister's forensic mind on its panel, but there are certainly some advising witnesses behind the scenes.
And is it really acceptable – given all the money spent on intelligence, and especially since 9/11 – to glibly state that 'intelligence is a guide, but cannot be the only reason why you make decisions'? Isn't this dangerously close to world lawlessness, in view of Blair and Brown's disregard for international law in relation to Iraq, and disregard of the Foreign Office's own legal advisors? But in reality, this is a justification for the fact that the 'sources were wrong' about WMD but they suited the purpose at the time: that is to say, their alleged disclosures about Iraq having WMD justified the true intent, which was regime change in this 'new world order'.
And it will happen again. Because, in Brown's own words, the equivocal legal advice of 7 March 2003 was unimportant, and would not have changed his view.
Joanne McNally is a writer and independent scholar and a campaigner and researcher in matters of truth and justice.
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